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Thursday, November 8, 2012
Wednesday, November 7, 2012
Friday, February 17, 2012
INFORMANTS, SURVEILLANCE, AND UNDERCOVER
OPERATIONS
"Good informant, good case. Bad informant, bad case. No informant, no case." The ability to be resourceful at information gathering
and collection is the key determinant of success at policing and with criminal
investigation. When police are lacking a witnesses or dealing with sophisticated criminals, or not getting
much out of the crime scene evidence, they turn to tried and true methods of law
enforcement informants and surveillance. Other sources of information also
exist that are either public or private, open or confidential, and the Internet,
of course, has become a tremendous reservoir of open source information. Use of
informants is the more legally permissive, yet Ethically
repugnant activity; and use of surveillance is the more
legally regulated, yet ethically sound activity. That's because
informants are often used in the loose, early phases of an investigation to
develop leads, and the activity of managing informants almost always involves
compromising the integrity of law enforcement. Surveillance, on the other hand,
is a well-established craft involving technique and gadgets, and is almost
always used to seal the fate of a target who has most likely already provided
the police with enough facts to establish probable cause. At least that's my
opinion, but there are those who think surveillance is the greater
evil, and there are those who think informants are just another
way ethical citizens can get involved in law enforcement.
I Johnnylaw209 have vital information on many solved and unsolved cases.The owners of Own a Car in Modesto are still saling cars at Auto Trailer Sales on Mchenry Ave near Wal-Mart My life as a General Contractor has been not only a builder of homes but jobs to those with that are less fortunate.I have employed thousands of people in my 20 years in the trade with jobs, training skills and resources to the best of my ability.This seems to put me in situations that are dangerous.I need to do what is right!The case involving BAILEY, RYAN BRANDON and Jeff......co defendant.This is a statement of events that needs to be said.I do not have to remain anonymous. I employed Ryan for work on a part time bases.for about 2 months my business as a Contractor is slow.I try to use Ryan when I can.I have become not on boss but a friend to him and his family. I have had many conversations with Ryan.Wanting a better life for his family.He just needs they right path.His father wasn't around and the same is about to happen to his children.I reported a tip to crime stoppers of a incident that my employee Ryan was beat up and pistol whipped by Jeff for refusing to illegally hook up power to his duplex.I also was aware that he was doing home invasions.He often tried to sale me items tools t.vs motorcycle r 6 black and purple.He bragged about to Ryan about stabbing some one who tried to stop him after entering a house. Ryan's association with Jeff is that of a gang member.There's no leaving this group with out consequences.Jeff would brag about the head shot caller of this group. I went to pick up Ryan after this incident to take him of the job.But was threatened and then hit 7 times in the head.I did not fight back because of the gun he set down prior to him flaunting it.I left with out Ryan because he said he had to help Jeff move and I quit I never like you anyways.This was out of character for Ryan.That evening I called crime stoppers a little spooked and concerned for my family.
johnnylaw209
INFORMANTS, SURVEILLANCE, AND UNDERCOVER
OPERATIONS
"Good informant, good case. Bad informant, bad case. No informant, no case." (Police saying)
"Good informant, good case. Bad informant, bad case. No informant, no case." (Police saying)
The ability to be resourceful at information gathering
and collection is the key determinant of success at policing and with criminal
investigation. When police are lacking witnesses (which is often the case),
especially eyewitnesses, dealing with sophisticated criminals, or not getting
much out of the crime scene evidence, they turn to tried and true methods of law
enforcement -- informants and surveillance. Other sources of information also
exist that are either public or private, open or confidential, and the Internet,
of course, has become a tremendous reservoir of open source information. Use of
informants is the more legally permissive, yet ethically
repugnant activity; and use of surveillance is the more
legally regulated, yet ethically sound activity. That's because
informants are often used in the loose, early phases of an investigation to
develop leads, and the activity of managing informants almost always involves
compromising the integrity of law enforcement. Surveillance, on the other hand,
is a well-established craft involving technique and gadgets, and is almost
always used to seal the fate of a target who has most likely already provided
the police with enough facts to establish probable cause. At least that's my
opinion, but there are those (Marx 1988) who think surveillance is the greater
evil, and there are those (Madinger 2000) who think informants are just another
way ethical citizens can get involved in law enforcement.
It's important to note at the outset that use of
informants and surveillance should be methods of last resort. These are not
methods for screening-out, or eliminating potential suspects from further
consideration; quite the opposite, they "screen-in" or incriminate more suspects
than usual (Gill 2000). These are methods that are expensive, time-consuming,
and controversial. They are inherently stressful and dangerous, and undercover
work is risky. Any and all information obtained from such sources, including
open sources, should be regarded as untrustworthy until it is corroborated by
other sources and/or converted from information into intelligence.
The word intelligence usually means information that has been subjected to
analysis and synthesis. It also usually means that the same information is
coming from different sources and has been checked out, or tested, as reliable.
CULTIVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF INFORMANTS
A cultivated source (as opposed to
a regular source) is neither a victim, witness, or suspect in an investigation
involving them or against them, but is someone with connections to the criminal
underworld that is able to tell you things that are about to happen.
Cultivated sources make the best informants. Apprehended criminals who turn
informants (or "flip" as its called) in hope of having their charges dropped or
reduced have NOT been cultivated. Their value is worthless because evidence law
sees them as saying or doing something out of self-interest. At law, there is a
presumption of truth in anything someone says or does against their
self-interest or safety, not in their self-interest if criminal charges are
pending against them. Ideally, you want active informants reporting information
about future crime, not witness informants for past crimes. Likewise, jailhouse
informants (or "snitches")
Cultivated sources typically include people doing
business around an area where criminals conduct their business. Examples
include taxi drivers, hotel employees, airline employees, automobile
salespeople, doormen, gun dealers, bartenders, private investigators, apartment
managers, package delivery employees, and proprietors or employees of
restaurants. The idea is that such people can get as close to criminal suspects
as possible (as, for example, their regular barber or prostitute) without
getting so close you're treading on privileged relationships (as, for example,
their wife or psychotherapist). It should be obvious by now that these types of
informants constitute a deviant street network of eyes and ears
for the police. By using such sources, you are looking for signs of crime in
the making. You are NOT doing infiltration or undercover work. If anything,
you are doing the equivalent of espionage work by setting up a ring of spies, or
agents-in-place. All you have to do in managing such people is keep them from
doing or provoking criminal things, but also keep them close to their own
sources of knowledge about criminal happenings which you conveniently check out
for corroboration purposes.
It used to be common for each and every police officer to
have their own set of informants or deviant street connections (as described
above). Today, most police departments only allow (and encourage) their
detectives to cultivate informants, but there are inconsistencies in how they
are registered and handled. Federal agencies have always
held to the practice of registering informants to the agency (almost as
quasi-employees), but municipal agencies tend to register (when they do register
or record the informant) to the individual detective. This creates the problem
of lost informants (nobody contacts them anymore) when a municipal detective
retires or leaves. There is also the problem of how to disseminate the
informant registry within the police department (the Chief usually keeps it
secret) because you don't want other officers arresting or messing with your
informants.
When an informant is on the payroll, they are usually
registered because the law requires financial auditing. They are also most
likely to hold the status of confidential informant,
although this term technically refers to informants who have some special
knowledge about a past or future crime and are potential targets for violence
and revenge. Confidential informants, or CIs, are allowed to be referred to as
anonymous or unnamed affiants in affidavits, do not appear on any other legal
documents, and never have to be disclosed in court or via any discovery process.
The management of informants is mostly a matter of
knowing what motivates them, and always making sure this motivation continues to
have some currency. There are many motivation-based typologies of informants in
the literature. Osterburg & Ward (2000) present one that distinguishes the
following:
-
volunteer informant -- usually an eyewitness to a crime or jealous spouse with specific information about vice activity or income tax evasion motivated by civic duty or vanity and kept motivated by gratitude
-
paid informant -- usually someone involved in a crime with particulars about a person they feel the police should know about and motivated by revenge or money and kept motivated by money
-
anonymous informant -- usually someone with precise or imprecise information about suspicious activities or a crime that is being planned or they believe is not yet discovered by police and motivated by repentance and kept motivated by reward or gratitude
Another useful typology is presented by Weston &
Lushbaugh (2003) who distinguish the usefulness of the informant as well as the
quality of their information:
-
basic lead informant -- usually a friend or acquaintance of a criminal with any number of possible motives who is most useful and accurate at revealing the whereabouts or geographical location of persons or property
-
participant informant -- usually a go-between or arrestee turned informant who helps police instigate a drug sting or reverse transaction or lure a suspect into surveillance
-
covert informant -- usually someone deep inside a criminal organization with a falling out or difference of opinion and wants to provide spot intelligence over a period of time as long as their identity is protected and a pleasant future guaranteed for them
-
accomplice-witness informant -- usually a co-defendant in a criminal case who agrees to testify for the prosecution and/or do one last undercover operation (by being wired for sound) in return to the package deal of immunity and the witness protection plan
Finally, there is the oldest typology of motives which
has been around for some 40 years simply because they never change (Harney &
Cross 1960):
-
fear -- people who feel threatened by the law or by other criminals (most police believe this is the best motivation)
-
revenge -- people, like ex-wives, ex-girlfriends, ex-employers, ex-associates, or ex-customers who want to get even
-
perversity -- people who are cop wannabes or think they're James Bond and/or hope to one day expose corruption
-
ego -- people who need to feel they are smart "big shots" and/or outwitting those they see as inferiors
-
money -- people who, like mercenaries, will do whatever it takes if the money is right
-
repentance -- people who want to leave the world of crime behind them and/or citizens fed up with crime
Proper handling of informants requires reward and control
(Hight 2000). There should be some system of departmental awards or rewards,
but at the same time, criminal and deviant activity should not be condoned.
Disastrous consequences can result from becoming too informal, too
unprofessional, or too involved in relationships with informants. The keys to
success at working an informant, according to Madinger (2000) are MOTIVATION +
ACCESS + CONTROL. You only have a good informant if all three of these are
present. The most precious asset you have in working an informant is trust. An
informant must trust that you will always be true to your word, and that
everyone all the up from the lowest ranking police officer to the chief
prosecutor will keep their identity secret.
WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAMS
The United States was the first country to
establish witness protection programs, and they started in 1971 (with the
Organized Crime Act of 1970) and were modified by the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984 to cover some relatives and associates of the witnesses.
The law gives the Department of Justice freedom to arrange for the security of
witnesses as they see fit, but there are tough standards for getting in.
First, the testimony has to be essential to the case, and there must be clear
evidence that the witness' life or his/her family's life is in danger. If
testimony is available from someone at less risk, then that person should (and
is) used. Those who are most successfully admitted into witness protection
are also the most credible and reliable witnesses. It is very clear what
they will say, and that they are going to show up at trial. Anyone who
flip-flops on the stand doesn't get any new identity. The U.S. Attorney
General's office has the final say in who gets admitted into the program,
The new identity is chosen by the witness
and his/her family. Care should be exercised to not choose a name that is
similar to the old name or one that a family researcher might come up with.
The U.S. Marshals Service then tries to find a reasonable job opportunity
(cover) for the witness. In some cases, the government pays for vocational
training. The government also assists (but does not pay for) housing.
Witnesses normally receive about $60,000 in subsistence payments, but if they
are unemployed and not actively seeking employment, the payments stop. No
payments or privileges (other than the protected identity) go out to family
members of the witness (although rare circumstances may dictate that happening
occasionally). No contact is allowed with unprotected family members (or
past associates). Protected witnesses are also prohibited from ever
returning to or visiting any city they lived in before. In the case of a
protected witness returning to the ways of crime (and there's some chance of
that), the witness' true identity is usually shared with local law enforcement,
but there's no automatic or continuing immunity. What usually happens is
that a re-offending protected witness is sent back to prison (under a new
identity) and placed under protective custody by corrections officials. If
a protected witness commits a crime, then the victims of that crime receive
compensation out of a Victim Compensation Fund.
Numbers of protected witnesses is
classified. Since the U.S. started using witness protection, no protected
witness has been killed yet. The model has been successfully imported to
other countries, and has extended from organized crime cases to gang crime, drug
trafficking, and terrorism cases. Australia, Germany, Colombia, and even
China have witness protection programs. The International Criminal Court
also has a witness protection program for use in crimes against humanity cases.
LAWS REGARDING USE OF INFORMANTS
There are legal restrictions on how far law enforcement
can go in keeping an informant's identity a secret. The general rule is that
confidentiality (as in "confidential informant" or "affiant") can be maintained
if the informant was used in the early stages of a case, say the reasonable
suspicion stage, not the probable cause stage, and most definitely if the
informant is not required to be a witness at trial. In some situations,
however, the Jencks Act or court decisions involving Brady v. Maryland
may be invoked, forcing the prosecutor to at least turn over a transcript of
statements made by the informant. The extreme situation would require a judge
to agree that exculpatory information might be found by revealing the
informant's identity (an unlikely scenario). Most prosecutors, however, would
drop the case or reduce the charges in honor of a police promise to maintain
confidentiality.
Courts have always recognized police use of informants a
historical tradition with no inherent moral weakness (U.S. v. Dennis
1950). Probably the most significant case in recent years was Hoffa v. U.S.
(1966) in which the Court considered, among other things, whether a police
informant must identify themselves as working with police under certain
conditions such as when they are recruiting other informants. After all, there
is a precedent like this in espionage law. The opinions in Hoffa and a
subsequent case (Maine v. Moulton 1985) yielded a requirement that police
admonish their informants to act natural and not try to draw out any particular
incriminating statements that would constitute the functional equivalent of
police questioning.
Courts will not tolerate the use of informants for
entrapment. Any incriminating statements made to an informant, in response
to the informant's remarks, which prompted the statement, will be
inadmissible. Entrapment is defined as inducing a person
to commit a crime they did not contemplate for the sole purpose of instituting a
criminal prosecution against them. Inducement is perceived by the Courts as
persistent coercion or trickery. Placing opportunity in front of the suspect is
not normally entrapment, but repeatedly providing them with the same opportunity
over and over again could be construed as persistent coercion. Similarly,
playing on a suspect's weaknesses such as their vanity or tendency to boast,
could be construed as trickery if it was being constantly prompted by an
informant. Above all, you should avoid using what is called an "agent
provocateur" who is a person who provokes or incites crime, such as someone who
urges a mob to riot or urges someone armed and angry to shoot.
Another thing to avoid is referring to your informants as
"special employees" or employees of any sort. This used to be fairly standard
law enforcement practice up until the late 1960s and early 1970s, and at least
one court case did involve a suit by such an informant demanding civil service
benefits for years of service. This kind of situation will most likely come up
when you need an informant with special skills (such as foreign language
proficiency or computer skills), or when an ex-informant puts previous law
enforcement experience on their resume. Modern law enforcement practice
strongly discourages informants from thinking of themselves as employees.
A final word of advice is NEVER meet with an informant
alone. Some have been known to kill their police handler, and others "set up"
their handler for assault or robbery, make false claims about physical or sexual
abuse, and allege that they were involved in a shakedown or extorted for money
and/or drugs. The initial debriefing (establishment of motive and/or
registration) of an informant should always take place on the officer's turf,
preferably in an office somewhere. Later meetings with the informant can occur
in a vehicle, safe house, or public place. A regular schedule of telephone and
face-to-face contacts will go a long way at convincing courts that this is a
managed informant who follows directions and has some credibility. So too, will
corroboration establish credibility. Police corroborate,
or double-check, what the informant says in a number of ways:
-
Cross-corroboration -- the informant's stories are cross-checked against one another for consistency over time
-
Background checking -- the informant's details are checked against computer databases
-
Other informants -- the informant's information is verified by another informant's information
-
Surveillance -- the place where the informant says something is happening is put under surveillance
-
Monitoring -- the informant is put under surveillance
-
Wiretapping -- the informant's telephone or premises is put under electronic surveillance
-
Undercover operations -- the people or place the informant mentions are infiltrated by undercover officers
SURVEILLANCE
Surveillance is the clandestine collection and analysis
of information about persons or organizations, or put another way, methods of
watching or listening without being detected. Most surveillance has physical
and electronic aspects, and is preceded by reconnaissance, and not infrequently,
by surreptitious entry (to plant a monitoring device). Surveillance can be a
valuable and essential tool in combating a wide range of sophisticated criminal
activities, including such offenses as kidnapping, gambling, narcotics,
prostitution, and terrorism. There are many different types of surveillance.
Peterson and Zamir (2000), for example, list seventeen types: audio,
infra/ultra-sound, sonar, radio, radar, infrared, visual, aerial, ultraviolent,
x-ray, chemical and biological, biometrics, animals, genetic, magnetic,
cryptologic, and computers. A shorter list would include four general types of
surveillance: visual; audio, moving, and contact. Here is an outline of the
four types from that shorter list:
I. VISUAL (ALMOST ALWAYS USES CAMERA)
A. FIXED (aka STAKEOUT OR PLANT) Locate yourself in
another building if possible, always be able to see through windows or
doorway
- (1) SHORT-TERM (use storefront or apartment)
(2) LONG-TERM (use rooftop or rented dwelling)
II. MOVING (aka TAIL OR SHADOW, uses CONCEALABLE CAMERA,
RADIO ALWAYS)
- A. FOOT (best to use leapfrogging teams to throw off suspect, always
carry something)
B. VEHICLE (works best if combined with bumper beeper)
III. AUDIO (aka WIRETAPPING OR ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING)
- A. TELEPHONE (tap at any of 4 locations: house, area, main, or bays of
central offices)
B. PEN REGISTER (record of outgoing calls, requires less probable cause)
C. TRAP-AND-TRACE (record of incoming calls, requires less probable cause)
D. "BUGGING" OF PREMISES (if both surveillance and surreptitious entry approved)
E. CONSENSUAL (using undercover tactic/accomplice-witness)
IV. CONTACT (aka TRACERS, DYE STAINS--fluorescent stains)
Preparation is key to a successful surveillance,
regardless of type. Learn all you can about your subject and the neighborhoods
in which you will be operating in. Whenever possible, target information should
be individualized, including who the associates are of your main target. If at
all possible, it is a good idea to make a thorough RECONNAISSANCE of the areas
in which you plan to conduct the surveillance to try to spot any known criminals
who are operating in the area. Familiarize yourself with the geography of the
area. Learn the names and locations of streets, alleys and passage ways. Observe
traffic conditions. Form a mental picture of where various buildings are
located.
Effective surveillance requires TEAMWORK. A clear chain
of command must be established, and every officer must fully understand what is
expected. Everyone involved should be briefed about the operation and any
special hazards or problems should be anticipated. Knowledge of a surveillance
operation in progress should be kept secret, but it is often useful to notify
other authorities in the area so that suspicious person reports are avoided and
two or more ongoing law enforcement operations do not bump into one another.
Some experts argue that it takes the resources of twelve operators and six
vehicles to put one ordinary individual under effective 24-hour physical
surveillance.
Select the best OBSERVATION POST by studying a large
scale map of the area, combined with your reconnaissance. The map will allow you
to check the angles of view from different locations. When no adequate indoor
observation post is available, set one up outdoors. Personnel may pose as
repairmen, street vendors, or other such people who would not arouse suspicion.
Sometimes cars and trucks can provide cover. Indoor posts, however, permit the
most use of equipment, such as spotting scopes, cameras, and recording devices.
All personnel at an observation post should have cover stories.
MOVING SURVEILLANCE is complex and offers the chance of
surprise. It makes heavy demands on resourcefulness. This is where blending into
the environment is most important. Officers should carry extra items such as a
hat, glasses, and a raincoat to permit changes of appearance. Remember to carry
loose coins and small bills so you can pay exact fare rather than wait for
change, and to carry pen and paper to leave a note when necessary. Sometimes, it
will be necessary to develop a set of signals that can be used on the street
without tipping off the suspect. Such things as how a newspaper is carried or
the way clothing is worn works well for this.
On FOOT, a suspect can easily shake off a single follower
without too much trouble. If you must follow a subject alone, it is best to stay
close behind and keep the subject in sight at all times. When foot traffic is
light, it may be best to cross to the other side of the street which is less
likely to attract attention from the subject. Be on the lookout for any
confederates of the subject as they may be watching to see if he/she is being
followed. They may also be waiting to ambush you. Avoid the obvious giveaways:
never peek over a newspaper, never sneak peeks from around a doorway. Avoid
catching anybody's eye. Be confident. Your own mistaken belief that you have
been spotted is more likely to give you away than anything else. If the subject
speaks to you, treat him/her as you would any other stranger who did the same
thing. If they accuse you of following them, deny it strongly, and say you think
they have a mental problem. If you are ever forced to abandon a surveillance,
don't return immediately to your office. The subject or a confederate may be
following you.
In two-officer foot surveillance, some of the best
tactics are to have one officer in front of the subject and another following
from behind. Two officers can also LEAPFROG a suspect. In this method, one
officer follows while the other moves well ahead, usually on the opposite
sidewalk. At some point, the lead officer stops and waits for the subject to
catch up with him. When the subject passes, the lead officer moves in behind
while the backup officer moves ahead and becomes the lead officer.
VEHICLES used for surveillance should be as unobtrusive
as possible. Aerials, communications gear, and other equipment should not be
visible. Headlights should be wired separately so the car appears differently at
night. In city traffic, the best plan is to stay one or two cars behind the
subject and far enough to the right so that the subject is not likely to notice
you in a rearview mirror. In rural areas, you must lie further back and know the
terrain. Two vehicles can also use the leapfrog technique.
A three-officer or three vehicle tactic is called the ABC
method. This allows the officers to change places from time to time, and cuts
down on the risk of losing a subject. In foot surveillance, officer C is called
the "rover" and walks along the opposite side of the street. In vehicle
surveillance, officer C might be the plainclothes "jumper" who can get out of
the car and blend into the foot environment easily. In important cases where
it is worth using more than two cars, the PERIMETER-BOX technique provides
maximum security while minimizing the risk of detection. One car follows the
subject, another leads, and another two maintain positions on parallel routes.
Coordination is handled by radio. This works well in both urban and rural areas.
Some of the things a subject will do to evade you
include: trying to get lost in a crowd, boarding a bus just as it is about to
leave, and entering a building by one door and leaving by another. Smarter
subjects will go up to a uniformed officer and point you out as someone who is
following them. If the officer delays you, the subject slips away; and if the
officer lets you go, the subject knows that you are an officer too. Another
trick is when the subject drops a worthless piece of scrap paper to see if you
pick it up. A variation on this is when the subject goes up to a passerby, shows
him or her an address on a piece of paper, and asks directions. The subject
tries hard to make this innocent contact look like a suspicious transaction, and
then watches to see if the passerby arouses suspicion and/or is followed. Almost
any erratic behavior may be an attempt at evasion. The subject may drive down a
one-way street the wrong way or make an illegal U-turn to see if you are
determined enough to follow him. If your suspect goes into a building to lose
you, take out some fluorescent powder and rub it on your shoes. This way, your
backup can track you if they have to. Otherwise, use your portable radio. At
least one officer should stay in the lobby of the building, and other officers
should cover as many exits as possible. If the subject takes an elevator, watch
the indicator. Where the car stops, try to pick up the trail on that floor. If
the suspect checks into a hotel, get the room number from the clerk and a record
of outgoing phone calls. If the subject goes into a theater, race track, or ball
park, the lead officer should attempt to sit right behind the subject. The same
applies to bus rides, trolley, or subway. If you can't get in the vehicle with
the subject, record the license number, company, place and time. The taxicab
company will tell you the destination. If the subject goes into a restaurant,
try to finish your meal first and pay your check shortly before the subject
leaves. If you suspect loses you in their own vehicle, when you catch up with
the suspect again, feel the radiator to see if it's still warm. Also try to read
the mileage both before and after a trip. Helicopter support is ideal for this,
but many departments restrict usage to rundown situations. If you lose your
suspect, don't feel ashamed. They have more ways to lose you than you have ways
to keep up. Just try to find the suspect again. Check the home and business
address. Use pretext phone calls to family, friends, associates. Station an
officer at the point where the suspect was last seen.
REPORTS are especially important in surveillance
operations. Each member of the team will have different facts, and these must be
correlated to make a complete report. Reports should be detailed. Little things
like discarding a matchbook are worth noting. Although your joint report should
have differences between officers ironed out, it is OK to have differences of
opinion in the report if they can't be reconciled. It is better to have too much
information than to omit something that may be significant.
LAWS REGARDING THE USE OF SURVEILLANCE & WIRETAPPING
Courts have always recognized surveillance as slightly
un-American, but ever since Olmstead v. U.S. (1928), they have been
attuned with public opinion that there are some times and places where privacy
cannot be expected. This changed with Katz v. U.S. in 1967 to a
person-based conception of privacy, meaning that privacy exists when and where a
person makes reasonable efforts to maintain it (reasonable expectation of
privacy doctrine). Also in 1967, the Court ruled that telephone surveillance
was technically a "search" and by 1972, the Court was ruling that every single
phone and wire tap needed prior judicial approval (although the government
continued NOT seeking court orders when international communications were
involved, on grounds that constitutional protections did not apply in these
cases). In 2001, with Kyllo v. U.S., the Court took another step at
protecting domestic privacy, by banning police use of thermal imaging systems
(and all future technology of that kind) on private residences.
Ex parte and other court orders are required for
any and all monitoring of conversations. An ex parte order is good for
only a short amount of time, and usually contains a minimizing requirement,
which means that officers must cease their eavesdropping or spying as soon as
the criminal activity related to the investigation stops. They can turn their
surveillance back on once the criminal activity starts up again. Title III of
the 1968 Omnibus crime bill still stands as requiring police to exhaust all
other options before even thinking about surveillance. A variety of other
restrictions exist at the constitutional, statutory, and local levels.
The Title III standard is probable cause (a crime has
been or is about to be committed). Title III did not adequately cover national
security electronic surveillance, however. That was addressed in the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, which set up a special review court in
Washington D.C., and made the standard a proportionality test (the benefits of
surveillance outweigh the harms). Current judicial doctrine also stresses the
exhaustion test (standard investigatory methods have been exhausted, failed, are
reasonably likely to fail, or are too dangerous to try). Concerns about
national security and domestic spying generally involve discussions of the FISA
(1978) law and also the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA).
CALEA is for domestic wiretaps and FISA is for international wiretaps. Each law
requires a report to Congress every year, and each law requires a court order
for every tap, although under FISA there is some leeway, including the
possibility of getting court orders retroactively.
Computer surveillance has some special regulations. In
1986, Congress passed the Electronics Communications Privacy Act, which provides
both civil and criminal penalties for violating Title III provisions. Subsequent
legislation dealt with appropriation requests by the FBI (circa 1999) to install
Clipper Chips on all newly manufactured computers, and then there was Homeland
Security's 2002 plan to implement Total Information Awareness by scanning all
networked computers. The FBI managed to get approval in 2000 for CARNIVORE,
which consists of boxes temporarily attached to the servers of recalcitrant
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) which capture the header information from
e-mail addresses of interest. Great Britain's Regulatory Investigative Powers
(RIP) bill allows similar machines to be permanently affixed to ISP servers, and
that nation has also relied heavily upon fixed video surveillance by planting
Closed Circuit Television cameras (CCTV) at places appropriate for monitoring
populations of interest. Facial recognition systems are often used in
conjunction with this type of surveillance. Roving wiretaps, which follow the
person and not the equipment, and is an important consideration in the age of
disposable cell phones and e-mail addresses, have been used since 1998. The
United States National Security Agency (NSA) is prohibited by law from domestic
surveillance, so its ESCHELON program cannot be used to intercept electronic
transmissions by citizens unless foreign traffic is involved or one of the
foreign nations in an exchange agreement does it.
FBI Project CARNIVORE
|
| Project Carnivore is part of a third-generation, online-detection software program called the Dragonware Suite, which allows the Bureau to reconstruct email messages, downloaded files and web pages. Historically, it has its origins in a 1997 program called "Omnivore" which ran on Solaris software and was incompatible with Windows (compatibility with Windows was not fully achieved until 1999). Although the FBI has provided minimal information to the public about Dragonware, and only a little more regarding Carnivore, the system is basically what is referred to as a "packet sniffer," a relatively common technology which examines or 'sniffs" packets of data streams on a network. Project Carnivore can only be utilized by the agency when a group or person is suspected of specified felonies, like terrorism, child pornography or exploitation, espionage, information warfare or fraud. Use of Carnivore is controlled under Title III of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, so a court order is needed to utilize the tool as well as authorization by a "high-level" official from the Department of Justice before a local United States Attorney office can make an application to a federal court. However, there are "emergency" provisions whereby surveillance is permitted to proceed immediately, when high-level Department of Justice authorization is obtained, so long as a court order is filed within 48 hours. Carnivore is not an information-gobbling monster that violates privacy. It only allows law enforcement to read and record only that data which a court order authorizes, either "to/from" information or full email content. It does NOT search thru the contents of every message NOR does it collect emails that contain certain keywords like "bomb" or "drugs." It selects messages based on criteria expressly set out in a court order; e.g., messages transmitted to or from a specific account or to/from a particular user. |
The Internet represents a vast "honey pot" of information
for the government. It has been trying for years to get Internet search engine
providers (e.g., Yahoo, Google) to turn over their records, on fairly shaky
legal grounds such as claiming to enforce the Child Online Protection Act (COPA)
of 1998. Such records would provide a window into the personalities of users --
what they want, what they dream about, etc. Places on the Internet where a user
has visited are kept in "cookies" that the search engines retain a record of.
Electronic privacy advocates recommend using software such as
Tor and
Anonymizer which hide a user's IP address (the string of numbers that
identifies a user's computer) from search engines by routing search requests
through a maze of servers.
As opposed to Internet spying, when places or people
themselves are wired for sound, this is usually called "bugging," and it is an
entirely different subtype of surveillance than telephone taps, pen registers,
and trap-and-traces. For example, surreptitious entry or some degree of stealth
are usually involved, the kinds of things we think about in terms of espionage.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Dalia v. United States 441 U.S. 238 (1979)
found nothing inherently prohibitive in bugging a premises as long as both the
surveillance and surreptitious entry were judicially approved.
Wiretapping is the covert interception of communications content from
telephones, telegraphs, fax machines, computers, pagers, wireless devices, and
any circuit or packet switch. It is distinguishable from
eavesdropping, another type of electronic surveillance, which involves
intercepting conversations in rooms or between individuals in person. In the
United States, a pen register or trap and trace is authorized by the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and similar statutes at the state level.
Pen/traps are easy to obtain and do (with telephone company assistance), very
useful in a criminal investigation, and only have to meet a low legal hurdle,
effectively relegating the role of the court to a ministerial function. Full
wiretaps are authorized by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 and a smaller number of similar statutes at the state level.
Wiretapping is also authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978. Pen registers are used the most frequently, followed by trap and traces
as second in frequency of use, and full all-content wiretaps as the least
frequently used. In terms of numbers, there are about 75,000 pen/traps a year
and only about 3,500 CALEA/FISA intercepts. The USA Patriot Act of 2001 makes
all Internet communications subject to pen register authority. Authorization
for a full all-content wiretap requires a proportionality test (the benefits
outweigh the harm) and a bona fide intelligence purpose. Authorization for a
pen register or trap and trace requires relevance to an ongoing investigation,
and in many cases, a judicial order is served on a service provider instructing
them to cooperate with authorities.
Wiretap law contains its own exclusionary rule. First of
all, no wiretap can be used for quasi-judicial or administrative law purposes.
This ensures that wiretaps remain a tool of last resort for serious crimes only,
mainly felonies or activities that resemble organized crime, espionage, or
terrorism. Secondly, any application for a wiretap must be reviewed and signed
by a politically accountable official before going on to a judge for approval.
The case of U.S. v. Giordano 416 U.S. 505 (1974) made it perfectly clear
that any rubber stamping of a political official's signature by their assistant
would result in suppression of evidence. Thirdly, there are documentation and
notification requirements. Judges must be kept informed of progress, and upon
completion, a full wiretap requires notifying all parties, at the time of
charging with an offense, that their conversations have been intercepted. A
judge, however, has discretion to decide whether other parties should be
notified, and which other parties should be notified. The practical effect of
this rule has implications for the number of civil lawsuits filed by other
parties over the shock at finding out they were wiretapped. Finally, there are
executional and minimization requirements. At the time of executing a wiretap
order, a professional effort should be made by officials to minimize the
interception of irrelevant conversation. This goes beyond the standard
protections afforded to privileged communication, such as that between husband
and wife, and requires officials to ensure that irrelevant portions of the
conversation are deleted and the most relevant portions are retained, all
without being done in a manner that suggests the recording has been altered or
fabricated in any prejudicial way. Rules of evidence subject wiretap
information to the authentication rule and best evidence rule. Unlike wiretaps,
pen registers and trap and traces require no notice to persons that their
communications have been intercepted. Nor is there any provision for judicial
supervision of a pen register in progress. Also, there is no minimization
rule.
UNDERCOVER WORK
There are about 50 different types of work which a police
officer can be assigned to, and almost all of them rely or depend upon the
authority of a uniform. One of the most notable exceptions to uniformed duty is
undercover work, arguably the most problematic area of law enforcement.
Undercover work is one of the most unique investigative techniques available to
law enforcement. The theory behind not wearing a uniform is that it removes any
impediments to acquiring information. It's part of the same
intelligence-gathering function as surveillance, eavesdropping, use of
informants, and espionage. It typically involves an assumed identity for a
defined and considerable amount of time. Undercover work requires secrecy. It
allows the police officer to circulate in areas where the police are not
ordinarily welcome.
The job of the undercover officer is to "make cases", in
other words, to gather enough information to enable a successful prosecution.
The purpose is not so much to obtain proof of criminal intent, the personalities
or lifestyles involved, but to obtain physical evidence (by purchasing drugs or
other contraband) and become the complainant seeking an arrest warrant. Once
the warrant is served, the officer's identity is usually revealed. Ordinarily,
a large number of arrests are made because the undercover officer has maximized
their contacts as much as possible (e.g. with the drug or crime ring) on their
own or by "converting" one or more of their contacts into informants. A typical
three-month operation may yield as many as 60 arrest warrants.
THE EARLY STAGES
Although there are many ways to initiate the undercover
role, a typical pattern is to bring the undercover officer in as an
acquaintance, business associate, or girlfriend/boyfriend of an informant, and
then to distance themselves from that informant. Once it's clear to all the
parties involved that the officer is single again, another undercover officer is
brought in as the boyfriend or girlfriend of the first undercover officer. The
key here is managing the informant because you don't generally want to take
extra risks with an informant around when you don't really need them. The
ideal targets are the "big" dealers or criminals, but most officers usually
start by going after the "small" fries, accumulating suspects and case material
as they go. The police supervisor, and sometimes, the prosecutor make a
decision early on about whether enough "mid-level" or "big" cases have been made
so that the operation can be terminated. In most cases, the critical factor is
continued safety of the officer(s). Training of the undercover officer is
sometimes nothing more than on-the-job training. Additional training may involve
a few short hours of instruction on how to identify drugs, contraband,
terminology, and prices. Sometimes, a refresher course in criminal law and
procedure is added. A system is usually put in place for the officer to turn
over evidence on a systematic basis or en masse at one time.
THE MIDDLE STAGES
Undercover officers usually are allowed to create their
own cover stories, and depending upon the type of crime involved (drugs, guns,
contraband, gambling, "subversive" groups), will eventually need more support
from the department. The need may arise, for example, to create false documents
or computer records for the undercover officer. This is not ordinarily done
with minor cases. The need may also arise for creating various kind of setup
situations in which the undercover officer "proves" their criminality or loyalty
by engaging in a staged showdown with regular police officers or other brush
with the law. The staged encounter may also be an opportunity to supervise
the undercover officer. Since supervision and continued surveillance becomes
more difficult as the operation progresses over time, undercover officers are
often "busted" to give a progress report and let management know if they need
more or less supervision.
THE LATE STAGES
Of all the kinds of police assignments, undercover work
puts you at most risk of corrupting your integrity. At some point, the
undercover officer may begin to lose perspective, and become emotionally
attached to this type of work. This does not mean they become emotionally
attached to the suspects, and become more criminal than cop. It simply means
that the department overall must think about maintaining its integrity by
calling in anyone who has been doing this kind of work so that they can salvage
their usefulness as a regular police officer. Danger and temptation play
roles in the late stages. Undercover officers tend to get paranoid after a
while, feeling like they have "cop" written across their foreheads. They will
begin to feel insecure and anxious about regular work and continued employment
with the department. They will often be amazed and astonished as some of the
things they have experienced and the dangers they have faced. Usually, they're
carrying their own gun at this point for personal protection or they've arranged
some other form of their own private surveillance and protection from real or
imagined dangers.
If paranoia develops, the undercover officer may start
having dreams about engaging in criminal activity. They can't help it because
subconsciously they succumb to temptation. The problem is worse in drug cases
because the officer may not be unable to decline the inhalation, ingestion, or
injection of controlled substances, although by strict policy, they should make
every attempt to avoid illegal consumption, even alcohol, during the operation.
However, if consumption occurs, one runs the risk of addiction, and the real
possibility of neurological changes. Anyone who engages in
participant-observation runs the risk of "going native", and it takes tremendous
self-discipline to keep from doing so. Many officers end their undercover
assignment when they feel "burned out" or express their first concern about
being "made" or express a desire to surface and become a regular officer.
Supervisors normally do not try to talk anyone into staying undercover, although
there is some concern for whether or not the appropriate cases have been made.
Most departments allow a "debriefing" period of time to help them adjust after
coming off undercover assignments.
SELECTION OF UNDERCOVER OFFICERS
In many cases, the undercover officer is new to the
department, and something about their "looks" makes supervisors feel they are
right for the job. They may have been interviewed and identified for such duty
while attending the training academy or while waiting on some civil service
eligibility list, but generally, they finish up a rookie year or two first as a
regular officer. In rare cases, an applicant is sworn in secretly by the Chief
and Personnel Officer the first day on the job. The department may have some
special need in an ongoing operation for someone who fits the "mold" and a new
recruit may fit the bill. Recruits from out of town are sometimes preferred, as
are ethnic-looking recruits with foreign language skills and the occasional
female. The reason for using new, inexperienced officers is that you may not
want someone who thinks, looks, and acts like a cop, especially for internal
affairs operations or certain political targets. You want someone who has still
got a civilian mindset.
HOW TO AVOID BEING "MADE"
Just as some officers have the uncanny ability to spot
criminals, some criminals have the uncanny ability to spot undercover officers.
Two things that will automatically tip any drug dealer off are: (1) familiar
customers introducing strangers who want to buy drugs; and (2) small-time users
who suddenly want to buy large quantities. The idea behind requests for large
quantities is to force dealers to contact their "connection." Most
professional criminals are keenly aware and ready for attempts to "flip" them
over into becoming informants. They will be prepared for this with bail money
set aside and a lawyer on retainer to set up an entrapment defense, guarantees
of immunity, and/or a written salary agreement. Intermediate level criminals
are also the group least likely to have addictions of their own. Top level
criminals hardly ever make mistakes. The importance of combining undercover
testimony with tape recordings or video recordings cannot be overstated,
especially when dealing with a sophisticated criminal.
At the other end of the spectrum, you have perpetrators
who are easily caught up in a "reverse" operation where the police officer is
the one selling the product. Perps who usually get caught up in these kind of
undercover operations are the small fries or "connections" who make stupid
mistakes. Almost always, the mistakes are made while intoxicated, high, or
fatigued in some way. However, even at this level, the criminal may make some
attempt to "verify" someone's story, or check the undercover officer's cover
out. Two of the most common things checked out are family history and
employment; these, and perhaps, an acquaintance or two.
How the undercover officer dresses and what they drive
are also factors. The clothing of drug addicts always doesn't fit right because
they're constantly losing or gaining weight. By contrast, most undercover
officers can't simulate this particular "fit" of clothing; they'll only look
sloppy and carry themselves like they have their "street uniform" on. Scraggly
beards that look recently grown also are a dead giveaway. The cars they drive
are also too well-maintained. A dope addict's car usually has three different
types of tires, a bunch a hamburger wrappers all over the inside, and screaming
kids in the back. There's also the way undercover officers give themselves away
with their eyes. Their eyes are too full of life, and they seem to wear
sunglasses all the time. A dope addict, on the other hand, will often
stubbornly or masochistically blind themselves by not wearing sunglasses even
when they should, and their eyes will look sunken, like they haven't slept in
days. Other cover-blowing moves include: being too sure about the price;
constantly making phone calls during a deal; being too overeager to buy;
offering sex in exchange for doing business; being too familiar; and being too
unfamiliar.
INTERNET RESOURCES
Association of Undercover Officers
California Narcotic Officers Association
Competitive Intelligence and Internet Information Gathering
Constitutional Guide to Using Cellmate Informants
Governmentality and the War on Terror: FBI Project Carnivore
Home Page of Prof. Gary Marx
How to Spot Undercover Agents
International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts
International Association of Undercover Officers
Investigative Resources and Public Records on the Internet
Law of Undercover Operations
National Association of Legal Investigators
Police Use of Confidential Informants
Trace Anybody Online (Net-Trace People Search)
Undercover School Operations
Use of Informants in FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations (Cointelpro)
Association of Undercover Officers
California Narcotic Officers Association
Competitive Intelligence and Internet Information Gathering
Constitutional Guide to Using Cellmate Informants
Governmentality and the War on Terror: FBI Project Carnivore
Home Page of Prof. Gary Marx
How to Spot Undercover Agents
International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts
International Association of Undercover Officers
Investigative Resources and Public Records on the Internet
Law of Undercover Operations
National Association of Legal Investigators
Police Use of Confidential Informants
Trace Anybody Online (Net-Trace People Search)
Undercover School Operations
Use of Informants in FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations (Cointelpro)
PRINTED RESOURCES
Adler, P. (1985). Wheeling and dealing. NY: Columbia Univ. Press.
Alberti, Anthony. (2002). Wiretaps. Bethesda, MD: Austin & Winfield.
Andrews, A. (1973). Intensive inquiry. NY: St. Martin's Press.
Billingsley, T. & P. Bean (2001) Informers. Portland: Willan.
Brown, M. (1985). "Criminal informants." Journal of Police Science and Administration 13: 251-56.
Cannavale, F. (1976). Witness cooperation. Lexington: Lexington Books.
Carroll, J. (1975). Confidential information sources. Los Angeles: Security World.
Dempsey, J. (2003). Introduction to investigations. Belmont: Wadsworth.
Fuller, C. (1998). The art of undercover. Youngsville, NC: Law Enforcement Associates. [author's website]
Gill, P. (2000). Rounding up the usual suspects. Burlington: Ashgate.
Harney, M. & J. Cross. (1960). The informer in law enforcement. Springfield: Charles Thomas.
Hight, J. (2000). "Working with informants." FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (Sept.): 15-20.
Jacobs, B. (1993). "Undercover deception clues" Criminology 31:281-99.
Madinger, J. (2000). Confidential informant. Boca Raton: CRC Press.
Manning, P. (1980). The narc's game. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Marx, G. (1982). "Who really gets stung?" Crime and Delinquency 8:165-93.
Marx, G. (1988). Undercover. Berkeley: Univ. of CA Press.
Miller, G. (1987). "Observations on police undercover work" Criminology 25:27-46.
Moore, M. (1977). Buy and bust. Lexington: Lexington Books.
Motto, C. & D. June. (1999). Undercover. Boca Raton: CRC Press.
Murphy, H. (1976). Where's what. NY: Quadrangle Books.
Norris, C. & C. Dunnighan. (2000). "Subterranean blues." Policing and Society 9: 385-412.
O'Connor, T. (2003). "Surveillance" and "Wiretapping." Pp. 624-629 & pp. 710-712 in R. Carlisle (ed.) The Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol 2. NY: Golson Books.
O'Hara, C. & L. O'Hara (1980). Fundamentals of criminal investigation. Springfield: Charles Thomas.
Osterburg, J. & R. Ward. (2000). Criminal investigation. Cincinnati: Anderson.
Peterson, Julie and Zamir, Saba. (2000). Understanding surveillance technologies. Boca Raton: CRC Press.
Pilant, L. (1993). "Achieving state of the art police surveillance." Police Chief Magazine (June): 25-30.
Rogers, D. (2000). "Quashing Carnivore concerns." FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (Nov): 66-70.
Tyson, J. (2003) “How Carnivore works”. Available online: www.howthingswork.com.
Weston, P. & C. Lushbaugh. (2003). Criminal investigation. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.
Adler, P. (1985). Wheeling and dealing. NY: Columbia Univ. Press.
Alberti, Anthony. (2002). Wiretaps. Bethesda, MD: Austin & Winfield.
Andrews, A. (1973). Intensive inquiry. NY: St. Martin's Press.
Billingsley, T. & P. Bean (2001) Informers. Portland: Willan.
Brown, M. (1985). "Criminal informants." Journal of Police Science and Administration 13: 251-56.
Cannavale, F. (1976). Witness cooperation. Lexington: Lexington Books.
Carroll, J. (1975). Confidential information sources. Los Angeles: Security World.
Dempsey, J. (2003). Introduction to investigations. Belmont: Wadsworth.
Fuller, C. (1998). The art of undercover. Youngsville, NC: Law Enforcement Associates. [author's website]
Gill, P. (2000). Rounding up the usual suspects. Burlington: Ashgate.
Harney, M. & J. Cross. (1960). The informer in law enforcement. Springfield: Charles Thomas.
Hight, J. (2000). "Working with informants." FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (Sept.): 15-20.
Jacobs, B. (1993). "Undercover deception clues" Criminology 31:281-99.
Madinger, J. (2000). Confidential informant. Boca Raton: CRC Press.
Manning, P. (1980). The narc's game. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Marx, G. (1982). "Who really gets stung?" Crime and Delinquency 8:165-93.
Marx, G. (1988). Undercover. Berkeley: Univ. of CA Press.
Miller, G. (1987). "Observations on police undercover work" Criminology 25:27-46.
Moore, M. (1977). Buy and bust. Lexington: Lexington Books.
Motto, C. & D. June. (1999). Undercover. Boca Raton: CRC Press.
Murphy, H. (1976). Where's what. NY: Quadrangle Books.
Norris, C. & C. Dunnighan. (2000). "Subterranean blues." Policing and Society 9: 385-412.
O'Connor, T. (2003). "Surveillance" and "Wiretapping." Pp. 624-629 & pp. 710-712 in R. Carlisle (ed.) The Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol 2. NY: Golson Books.
O'Hara, C. & L. O'Hara (1980). Fundamentals of criminal investigation. Springfield: Charles Thomas.
Osterburg, J. & R. Ward. (2000). Criminal investigation. Cincinnati: Anderson.
Peterson, Julie and Zamir, Saba. (2000). Understanding surveillance technologies. Boca Raton: CRC Press.
Pilant, L. (1993). "Achieving state of the art police surveillance." Police Chief Magazine (June): 25-30.
Rogers, D. (2000). "Quashing Carnivore concerns." FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (Nov): 66-70.
Tyson, J. (2003) “How Carnivore works”. Available online: www.howthingswork.com.
Weston, P. & C. Lushbaugh. (2003). Criminal investigation. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.
Last updated: Sept. 27, 2011
Not an official webpage of APSU, copyright restrictions apply, see Megalinks in Criminal Justice
O'Connor, T. (2011). "Informants, Surveillance, and Undercover Operations." MegaLinks in Criminal Justice. Retrieved from http://www.drtomoconnor.com/3220/3220lect02c.htm last accessed on Sept. 17, 2011.
Not an official webpage of APSU, copyright restrictions apply, see Megalinks in Criminal Justice
O'Connor, T. (2011). "Informants, Surveillance, and Undercover Operations." MegaLinks in Criminal Justice. Retrieved from http://www.drtomoconnor.com/3220/3220lect02c.htm last accessed on Sept. 17, 2011.
johnnylaw 209
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Monday, January 16, 2012
About the Department of Commerce | Department of Commerce
AMASSeco Informer
The U.S. Department of Commerce promotes job creation, economic growth, sustainable development and improved standards of living for all Americans by working in partnership with businesses, universities, communities and our nation’s workers. The department touches the daily lives of the American people in many ways, with a wide range of responsibilities in the areas of trade, economic development, technology, entrepreneurship and business development, environmental stewardship, and statistical research and analysis.
To drive U.S. competitiveness in the global marketplace, the Commerce Department works to strengthen the international economic position of the United States and facilitates global trade by opening up new markets for U.S. goods and services. Here at home, the Commerce Department promotes progressive business policies that help America’s businesses and entrepreneurs and their communities grow and succeed. Cutting-edge science and technology at the department fosters innovation, and a focus on research and development that moves quickly from the lab to the marketplace generates progress and new 21st century opportunities. No matter where businesses are in their life cycle, whether just getting off the ground or looking to expand into overseas markets, the Commerce Department is singularly focused on making U.S. companies more innovative at home and more competitive abroad, so they can create jobs.
The Commerce Department also provides effective management and monitoring of our nation’s resources and assets to support both environmental and economic health. Through critical weather monitoring, weather forecasts and resource preservation, the department protects not only public safety and security but also our oceans, coasts and marine life while assisting their economic development. Other essential operations conducted by the Commerce Department include the constitutionally mandated decennial census, which serves as the basis of America’s representative democracy, as well as the system by which businesses and innovators secure intellectual property rights. The Secretary of Commerce leads the department’s efforts, overseeing a $7.5 billion budget and nearly 47,000 employees worldwide.
More About Commerce's Organization
Commerce Leadership (with contact information)
Organizational Chart (PDF)
Commerce Directives Management Program (DAO and DOO)
Office of Inspector General
Budget, Performance and Planning
Department of Commerce Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan (PDF)
Portals and Partners
Entrepreneurship.gov
USA.gov
Export.gov
Manufacturing.gov
Regulations.gov
Grants.gov
Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America
Forms.gov
Fedbizopps.gov
gpoaccess.gov
Commerce History
Secretaries of Commerce
Commerce Department 100th Anniversary - A Photographic History
Information About Commerce Websites
Disclaimer
Accessibility Policy
U.S. Department of Commerce Linking Policy
Information Quality
Contact Us
Share
Printer-friendly version
Facebook Icon
YouTube Icon
Twitter Icon
Flickcr Icon
United States Department of Commerce
Home
PLAIN Language
Whitehouse.gov
Privacy Policy
Comment Policy
FOIA
Usa.gov
GobiernoUSA.gov
Inspector General
No FEAR Act
Recovery.gov
Commerce Archive
EEO Policy
Improper Payments
Information Quality
About the Department of Commerce | Department of Commerce
The U.S. Department of Commerce promotes job creation, economic growth, sustainable development and improved standards of living for all Americans by working in partnership with businesses, universities, communities and our nation’s workers. The department touches the daily lives of the American people in many ways, with a wide range of responsibilities in the areas of trade, economic development, technology, entrepreneurship and business development, environmental stewardship, and statistical research and analysis.
To drive U.S. competitiveness in the global marketplace, the Commerce Department works to strengthen the international economic position of the United States and facilitates global trade by opening up new markets for U.S. goods and services. Here at home, the Commerce Department promotes progressive business policies that help America’s businesses and entrepreneurs and their communities grow and succeed. Cutting-edge science and technology at the department fosters innovation, and a focus on research and development that moves quickly from the lab to the marketplace generates progress and new 21st century opportunities. No matter where businesses are in their life cycle, whether just getting off the ground or looking to expand into overseas markets, the Commerce Department is singularly focused on making U.S. companies more innovative at home and more competitive abroad, so they can create jobs.
The Commerce Department also provides effective management and monitoring of our nation’s resources and assets to support both environmental and economic health. Through critical weather monitoring, weather forecasts and resource preservation, the department protects not only public safety and security but also our oceans, coasts and marine life while assisting their economic development. Other essential operations conducted by the Commerce Department include the constitutionally mandated decennial census, which serves as the basis of America’s representative democracy, as well as the system by which businesses and innovators secure intellectual property rights. The Secretary of Commerce leads the department’s efforts, overseeing a $7.5 billion budget and nearly 47,000 employees worldwide.
More About Commerce's Organization
Commerce Leadership (with contact information)
Organizational Chart (PDF)
Commerce Directives Management Program (DAO and DOO)
Office of Inspector General
Budget, Performance and Planning
Department of Commerce Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan (PDF)
Portals and Partners
Entrepreneurship.gov
USA.gov
Export.gov
Manufacturing.gov
Regulations.gov
Grants.gov
Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America
Forms.gov
Fedbizopps.gov
gpoaccess.gov
Commerce History
Secretaries of Commerce
Commerce Department 100th Anniversary - A Photographic History
Information About Commerce Websites
Disclaimer
Accessibility Policy
U.S. Department of Commerce Linking Policy
Information Quality
Contact Us
Share
Printer-friendly version
Facebook Icon
YouTube Icon
Twitter Icon
Flickcr Icon
United States Department of Commerce
Home
PLAIN Language
Whitehouse.gov
Privacy Policy
Comment Policy
FOIA
Usa.gov
GobiernoUSA.gov
Inspector General
No FEAR Act
Recovery.gov
Commerce Archive
EEO Policy
Improper Payments
Information Quality
About the Department of Commerce | Department of Commerce
Johnnylaw vs Outlaws in the 209
John Valadez
Spotting a Narc or Undercover Cop
The number one most common way for a dealer to get busted is to have an informant rat per out. My advice is to stay aware of people's actions, and think about their motivations for those actions, during absolutely every deal that you make. A seemingly trustworthy person can turn to a narc pretty quick with the types of intimidation, threats and lies that the police will feed per. Most people busted for a crime will be given the opportunity to rat on their drug dealers and friends. Rapists and murderers probably aren't offered this opportunity, but just about everybody else is, and drug users/dealers are always offered the chance, except in very rare circumstances. Usually, police won't spend much time chasing someone they know wouldn't be willing to rat on per friends.
The following are indicators to look for when trying to determine if a particular customer or supplier is an informant for the police. These, of course, are not absolute indicators. A really good Narc, backed by determined police won't show any of these signs, or might show just a couple, but more often than not, the police don't take the time to do things really well. If they screw up a deal, it doesn't matter to them because there's always other drug dealers to chase. They'd rather do thing's as quickly as possible, and risk having a few cases thrown out in order to bust as many people as they possibly can. The result is that they push and threaten their informants hard and don't allow them the time to make a deal in a professional and patient manner.
Narcs
will:
Wish to meet outside, in a parking lot
Need to be accompanied by a friend
Never be willing to front money
Want to make the deal within the hour or
Wish to set an exact time to make the deal
Try to control most aspects of the deal
Say, "I'm not a narc," "Don't worry, I'm cool" etc.
Lie
Try to avoid making the deal in your home or car
Not be available to make a deal on short notice
Call from an unusual phone number
Use pressure tactics if you're unsure about making the deal
Offer the best deal in the neighborhood
Reassure you that there's "nothing to worry about"
Become pushy if you brush off the deal or delay it
Forget phone courtesies and openly discuss the deal
Prefer to make the deal between 6AM and 11Pm
Be evasive or unwilling to talk about recent legal troubles
Quickly switch from customer to dealer or vice versa
Narcs might
or might not:
Be willing to make eye contact with you
Be willing to hang out for long periods of time
Be willing to do lots of drugs with you
Try to argue about price
Play by the rules (whatever those may be)
Try to buy as much as they possibly can
My job as a undercover cop was only slightly different than being a narc Narcs may or may not be willing to do drugs with you, but possibly will avoid the idea, and probably won't be willing to do large quantities or "harder" drugs. I suspect, however, that this changes as a person gets into the big time, and the cops are more desperate to make a large bust. Most of the points I listed for narcs also apply to undercover cops, except that under covers are more willing to deal with you on your own turf, and may be available for short-notice deals. One common myth is that if asked, an undercover cop has to admit that pe is a cop. This used to be true years ago, but I should stress, undercover cops can legally lie about anything they want. Remember also, that an undercover or narc can be either a dealer or a customer, and can arrest people by both selling or buying.
But the best advice I could ever give another dealer is simply LISTEN TO YOUR INSTINCTS. Use your common sense. The things I've listed on this page are merely indicators. It all depends on how crafty or desperate the narc is, how bored the police are or how much they dislike you. If something doesn't seem right, cancel the deal or at least delay the deal and test the reaction. If the person seems to panic, you've got your red flag. At the very least, change some aspect of the deal and test the reaction. You don't need to grab for every dollar that floats past your nose. Have enough self confidence to back out even at the last second if a red flag goes up. There will always be more deals.
If you do happen to suspect a person of being an informant, my suggestions are to first, do not accuse the person to per face. If pe is a narc, you don't want to be making an enemy out of per. But do not allow the person to see any aspect of your dealing, and do not allow the person in your home for any reason. Again, be nice about it. Remember that you have every right to kick someone out of your home on just a vague suspicion, but you don't have the right to be an asshole about it, or accuse and condemn without proof.
If you do suspect a Narc, ask everyone about per. Try to find out more information, and if your suspicions are confirmed, warn absolutely everybody that might be a target for the narc. And depending on the situation, if you're feeling noble, talk to the narc, and try to make per understand the mistake pe is making.
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